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Abstract: In a dynamic model of sports competition, we show that when spectators care
only about the level of e®ort exerted by contestants, rewarding schemes that depend lin-
early on the ¯nal score di®erence provide more e±cient incentives for e®orts than schemes
based only on who wins and who loses. This is inconsistent with the prevalence of rank
order incentive schemes in sports competitions. We provide an explanation by introducing
spectators' demand for suspense as greater utility derived from contestants' e®orts when
the game is closer. As the demand for suspense increases, so does the advantage of rank
order schemes.
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{ i {Suspense
1. Introduction
Sport contestants can earn substantial ¯nancial prizes. Total 2005 prize money at Wimble-
don has topped $10 million for the ¯rst time in 2005. The Professional Golf Association
has distributed approximately $250 million in prize money across 48 events in the PGA
Tour. Even in less popular sports, prize money plays an important role. Nearly $21 million
in prize money was awarded in international track and ¯eld competitions in 2004. Inter-
estingly, prize money is typically allocated on the basis of who wins and who loses. More
informative measures of performance such as score di®erences rarely matter, even though
they are readily available. When there are several contestants in a sporting event, rewards
depend on who wins the most games (round robin tournament), or on the sequence of
games won (elimination tournament). Total scores and other performance measures mat-
ter only in terms of determining who the winner is, not how much the winner gets.1 Why
do win-lose rank order incentives dominate in the design of ¯nancial incentives in sports?
The literature on optimal design of rank order tournaments that began with Lazear
and Rosen (1981) explains how tournaments provide incentives for e®orts. However, the
literature has not shed much light on when rank order incentive schemes should be used
in lieu of schemes based on other relative performance measures, particularly when the
agents are risk neutral. Prendergast (1999, pp 36-37) reviews several reasons for using
tournaments, but it remains unclear why prizes in sporting events depend only on rank
order of scores and not on scores themselves. Holmstrom (1982) casts doubt on the im-
portance of rank order tournaments in incentive contracts by demonstrating that relative
1 Although for superstar athletes prize money pales in comparison with income from sponsorship deals
(only about $6 million of Tiger Woods' income of close to $90 million in 2004 were prize money), sponsorship
money can depend on factors such as charisma and star power other than athletic performance, so prize
money is still the main provider of incentives for e®orts in a given sport event. Likewise, in recent years
contracts for players in some team sports are loaded with incentive clauses that often take on a strong piece
rate °avor (e.g., salaries for batters depending on the batting average in baseball), but ¯nancial incentives
for team e®orts remain largely independent of relative performance measures such as score di®erences.
{ 1 {performance schemes such as rank order tournaments have no intrinsic incentive value if
output measures of individual agents are separately observed and are uncorrelated.2
One possible reason why rank order schemes dominate in sports is that spectators
simply derive great utility from watching rank order contests (see, e.g., O'Kee®e, Viscusi
and Zeckhauser, 1984, pp 28-29). Such preference for rank order contests presumably arises
from the notion that winner-takes-all tournaments increase the stakes that contestants face
through payo® discontinuity, and create the drama that somehow makes the games more
appealing to spectators. However, a gripping drama cannot be reduced to mere payo®
discontinuity. Even if spectators' interests are piqued by a large payo® discontinuity before
a sports game starts, the game can turn lop-sided and spectators may lose their interests.
Payo® discontinuity does not capture the intuitive notion that whether a sporting event is
involving or not depends on how the game is played out from the beginning to the end.
In this paper, we present an explanation of the dominance of rank order schemes
in sports that rests on an analysis of the dynamics of sports competitions and on an
understanding of the nature of spectators' demand for drama. The starting point is a
dynamic version of Lazear and Rosen's (1981) tournament model, presented in Section 2. In
their original static model, tournament participants exert e®orts that determine \scores."
Within this context, if participants are risk-neutral, rank order tournaments and other
schemes based on relative performance measures such as score di®erences perform equally
well: when designed optimally, they all achieve the ¯rst best outcome. This conclusion is
no longer valid in a sports game with two halves where two contestants choose e®orts at
the beginning of each half. In a rank order scheme, contestants are rewarded according
to whose total score is greater, and therefore they keep up the e®orts in the second half
only when the game is still close at the end of the ¯rst half. In a linear score di®erence
scheme, rewards depend on the ¯nal score di®erence not just in terms of its sign but also
linearly in terms of its magnitude, and so contestants face constant incentives to exert
e®ort independent of the stage of the game and of the score di®erence at the end of the
2 There are also some works on design of tournaments in a dynamic setting (Aron and Lazear, 1990;
Cabral, 2003), but their focus is on risk-taking rather than on e®ort choice. Dynamic tournament models
also appear in the literature of patent races (e.g., Harris and Vickers, 1987), where the issue is whether
competitors' R&D e®orts increase with the intensity of their rivalry.
{ 2 {¯rst half. In Section 3, we show that under the standard assumption that contestants face
convex e®ort costs, constant allocation of e®orts across di®erent states of the game reduces
e®ort costs to the contestants. As a result, linear score di®erence schemes out-perform rank
order schemes. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions, the optimal linear score di®erence
scheme induces the ¯rst best e®orts.
The result that rank order schemes are dominated by linear score di®erence schemes
suggests that spectators in a sporting event care about other characteristics of the sports
game besides contestants' e®ort levels. In Section 4 we capture a unique feature in the
demand for sports, and in the design of incentives in sports, by assuming that spectators
enjoy \suspense" in the game: Instead of caring about e®orts per se, spectators derive
greater utility from contestants' e®orts when the game is closer and the outcome is still
uncertain. Under a linear score di®erence scheme, contestants continue to exert e®orts in
the second half to collect rewards even when the game has become lop-sided and spec-
tators have lost their interests. In contrast, when spectators demand suspense, a rank
order scheme provides incentives for continuing e®orts exactly when such e®orts matter to
spectators. We show that as the demand for suspense increases, the optimally designed
rank order scheme increases the stake for the contestants. The more spectators demand
suspense, the better rank order schemes perform relative to linear score di®erence schemes.
When the demand for suspense is su±ciently high, the optimal rank order scheme domi-
nates all linear score di®erence schemes. Although the ¯rst best e®orts cannot be achieved
by a rank order scheme when the demand for suspense is su±ciently high, there is a sense
that the optimal rank order scheme does the best in terms of satisfying the demand among
all schemes based on the ¯nal score di®erence. This is established with further restrictions
on the model. We show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of
incentive schemes that reward contestants on the basis of the ¯nal score di®erence.
In applying the standard contract theory to the world of sports, we submit to the
premise that players in a sporting event condition their e®orts on expected reward and
level of competition throughout the game. There is substantial evidence in sports, both
casual and statistical, which supports this premise: in team sports, team e®ort drops
once a margin of victory is established as ¯rst-team players are replaced by bench play-
ers; Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) ¯nd signi¯cant incentive e®ects on performance of
{ 3 {professional golfers on European circuit by comparing tournaments with di®erent prize
money and by comparing players in di®erent positions at the beginning of the ¯nal round;
Fernie and Metcalf (1996) ¯nd similar e®ects by comparing the performance of British
jockeys who are employed on ¯xed retainers with those who are o®ered prizes for winning
races. Further, in applying contract theory to sports, we make a simplifying assumption
that players' e®ort choice is one-dimensional. In other words, we abstract from strategic
issues such as allocation of e®orts between o®ense and defense (Palomino, Rigotti and
Rustichini, 2000; Brocas and Carrillo, 2002). There is no doubt that in many sports, par-
ticularly team sports, strategic choices are important, and that taking such choices into
account can enrich our analysis. However, given our goal of understanding the form of
reward schemes in spectator sports, it is a natural ¯rst step to concentrate on the simple
case of uni-dimensional e®ort choice. Section 5 contains further discussions of other sig-
ni¯cant restrictions imposed on the dynamic contract, and relates our dynamic incentive
design problem to the broad literature on incentives.
Our concept of demand for suspense contributes to a large existing literature on the
determinants of the demand for sport events. In particular, our concept is consistent with
the \uncertainty of outcome hypothesis" in the empirical sports literature, which states
that spectators are willing to pay more for more uncertain games (Knowles, Sherony and
Haupert, 1992). Also related is the ¯nding in the literature that sports leagues try to
maintain \competitive balance" by minimizing the disparity between the strong and weak
teams (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Sanderson, 2002), and some recent research about its im-
plications to income distribution in sports (Palomino and Rigotti, 2000; Szymanski and
Kesenne, 2004). Both the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis and the idea that compet-
itive balance helps provide e®ective e®ort incentives can be understood in the standard
tournament model of Lazear and Rosen, where contestants supply more e®ort when the
game is closer. What the empirical sports literature has overlooked is the fact that a sport
event is an experience good and the spectators' experience depends on the dynamics of
contestants' e®orts as the game is played out. We model a sport contest as a sequence of
e®ort choices by the contestants, opening up the possibility that the demand for a sport
event, measured for example by viewership ratings, changes in a systematic way as the
{ 4 {contest unfolds. The main results of the present paper are brie°y summarized in Section
6, which concludes with some thoughts on the methodology of the present paper and dis-
cussions of possible applications of our framework of dynamic sports competition to other
economic issues.
2. The Model
There are two players in a sports game that consists of two halves. In each half k = 1;2,
the two players j = A;B choose e®orts ¹
j
k simultaneously. E®ort choices are modeled as
one-dimensional, non-negative real variables. Let ±k denote the cumulative score di®erence
at the end of each half, de¯ned as A's score minus B's score. We assume that changes
in the score di®erence in each half are determined by the e®orts ¹A
k and ¹B
k of the two




±2 = ±1 + ¹A
2 ¡ ¹B
2 + ²2:
where the random variables ²k, k = 1;2, are i.i.d. across the two halves, and have a di®er-
entiable, uni-modal density f that is symmetric around 0. Denote as F the corresponding
distribution function of ²k. For analytical convenience, we assume that the support of ²k
is the real line.
Our formulation of dynamic sports games is admittedly simplistic, even in the con-
text of individual sports. It involves a number of simplifying assumptions, but allows us
to focus on the comparison of di®erent incentive schemes. First, we limit the strategic
interactions of the two players to dynamic e®ort choices, and abstract from other strategic
issues such as risk-taking. The outcome of the game, that is, the ¯nal score di®erence
±2, depends only on e®ort choices of the two players in the two halves, and the random
variables ²k. The random variables capture the intrinsic uncertainty in the game, and is
assumed to enter the score additively. This means that greater e®orts by the players do
not make the game outcome more or less uncertain. Another important assumption we
made is that the random variable ²k in each half k has a symmetric density function. This
symmetry assumption is standard in the literature following Lazear and Rosen (1981), and
{ 5 {is especially handy in our model as it simpli¯es the characterization of the equilibrium
e®ort dynamics. Finally, by adopting a model of continuous scores, we remove the possi-
bility of a tied game and avoid its implications to player incentives and contract design.
This simpli¯cation does not qualitatively alter our main conclusions.
The two players are risk-neutral, and do not discount. They simultaneously choose
e®ort at the beginning of each half to maximize their expected reward less the sum of
e®ort costs in the two halves. The players observe the ¯rst half score di®erence ±1 before
choosing their e®orts in the second half. We assume that the cost of e®ort, C, is the same
in each half and the same for the two players. In addition to the standard assumption that
C is increasing and convex, we make the following technical assumption.
Assumption 1: 0 · C000 · (C00)2=C0, with at least one strict inequality; C0(0) = 0 and
C0(1) = 1.
Assumption 1 imposes two global restrictions on the cost function. These restrictions are
satis¯ed by increasing quadratic cost functions (e.g., C(¹) = 1
2¹2). The assumption that
the two players share the same e®ort cost function, together with the implicit assumption
that their e®orts are equally e®ective in producing scores, yields the interpretation that
the two players have equal \abilities." Since Lazear and Rosen (1981), there has been
an extensive literature on the optimal design of rank order schemes with heterogeneous
players. The present paper instead asks why rank order schemes should be used to provide
incentives for e®orts in the ¯rst place, so we abstract from the issues that arise when
players have di®erent abilities.
The incentive designer chooses a reward scheme to maximize spectators' utility minus
the expected reward to the players, subject to voluntary participation and equilibrium
response by the players. Let U be the reservation payo® of each player before entering
the game. Spectators derive utility from e®orts exerted by players during the game.3 We
de¯ne Pk as the rate of spectator utility per unit of e®ort ¹
j
k in half k = 1;2, and we assume
that this rate is the same for the two players. Players' e®orts are observable to spectators,
3 We assume that spectators do not derive utility from simply watching their favorite player win the
game. That is, in our model spectators are not \fans."
{ 6 {but not contractible. This ensures that the designer's objective function can involve e®orts
explicitly, but that the designer cannot condition rewards directly on e®orts.4 Moreover,
rewards can depend only on the ¯nal score di®erence, not on the score di®erence ±1 at the
end of the ¯rst half. These contractual restrictions are reasonable for incentive design in
sports. The implications of relaxing these assumptions are discussed in Section 5.
We will distinguish between the case where P2 is constant and the case where it
depends on the ¯rst half score di®erence P2(±1). When P2 is constant, we will say that
spectators care only about \excitement." One goal of the model is to capture the idea
that spectators care also about \suspense" in addition to excitement. A simple way of
modeling demand for suspense is by assuming that spectators care more about e®orts
when the game is closer at the end of the ¯rst half.5 A game that remains close at the end
of the ¯rst half is one that has a less predictable outcome, or a greater chance of outcome
reversal. We will say that spectators care also about suspense when P2 as a function of
±1 is symmetric around and single-peaked at ±1 = 0. A constant P2(±1) should be viewed
as a polar case corresponding to no preference for suspense. The other polar case occurs
when the function P2(±1) is an indicator function with all the weight at ±1 = 0 (tied
¯rst half), which corresponds to an extreme preference for suspense. The intermediate
cases are de¯ned precisely in Section 4. Throughout the paper, we maintain the following
assumption:
Assumption 2: P1 =
R
P2(±1)f(±1)d±1.
In the absence of any presumption regarding how much spectators enjoy the excitement of
the game in the ¯rst half versus in the second half, Assumption 2 is a natural starting point.
4 The assumption of observable e®orts is standard in the contest literature following Lazear and Rosen
(1982). Since the players are risk-neutral in our model, our results remain valid in a modi¯ed model
where individual scores are observed and used in place of e®orts in the objective function of the incentive
designer. See Section 5 for a discussion.
5 Television audience of a sports game change channels or switch o® their sets once outcome of the
game appears certain. When the Bowl Championship Series eliminated the margin of victory component
in its computer ranking formula for the 2002 college football season so that the chance of qualifying for
post-season bowl games no longer depends on the margin of victory in regular season games, American
Football Coaches Association announced in its online news (www.afca.org) that the change was designed to
\end the possibility of teams running up scores in order to improve their positions in the BCS standings."
Presumably AFCA understood that a football game loses all its attraction at the point when the outcome
becomes certain to spectators, even if the winning side keeps up their e®ort.
{ 7 {In the case when spectators care only about the excitement of the game, Assumption 2
implies that P2 = P1. We use separate notation for P1 and P2 throughout the paper, to
highlight the distinction between the case where P2 is constant (Section 3) and the case
where P2 depends on ±1 (Section 4). Assumption 2 is not needed for some of the analysis;
its role will become clear later.
Some may argue that the demand for suspense in sports competitions is purely a taste
for uncertain outcomes, and that the satisfaction of this demand requires a substantial
di®erence in payo®s between the winner and the loser. It is hard to distinguish this view
of suspense from the taste for uncertainty, such as in the case of movies or lotteries, where
e®orts of participants are not involved or consumers do not derive utility from such e®orts.
Further, this view allows no role for dynamics of sports games, which intuitively is an
ingredient to what makes sports games interesting to spectators. In contrast, our de¯nition
of the demand for suspense is tailored to the context of dynamic sports competitions. We
take two components in the demand for sports that have been shown to matter, demand
for uncertainty and demand for play quality or e®ort, and combine them by postulating a
complementary relation between the two. According to our de¯nition, the marginal utility
for spectators derived from additional e®orts by the players is enhanced when the game
outcome remains uncertain. We recognize that the issue of suspense is multi-faceted, and
that there may be other ways to model the consumer demand for suspense. These other
dimensions to suspense may in°uence the incentive design of sport competitions, but do
not invalidate our results.
3. Excitement Only
This section deals with the benchmark case where spectators care only about excitement
(that is, P2 is constant). We characterize equilibrium e®ort dynamics under rank order
incentive schemes and under linear score di®erence schemes. We derive the optimal rank
order scheme and the optimal linear score di®erence scheme, and compare the performance
of these two incentive schemes.
A rank order scheme rewards players entirely on the basis of who wins and who loses,
regardless of the score di®erence at the end. Such a scheme is represented by an \incentive





Figure 1. A rank order scheme
prize" r, which is the di®erence between the winner's and the loser's rewards, and a ¯xed
transfer l, which can be either positive or negative. See Figure 1 for an illustration. To ¯nd
the optimal rank order scheme, we use backward induction to characterize the equilibrium
response to an arbitrary rank order scheme (r;l).
In the second half, given ¯rst half score di®erence ±1, player A wins if ±2 is positive,
or ±1 +¹A
2 ¡¹B
2 +²2 > 0. The probability that A wins the game is therefore 1 ¡F(¡±1 ¡
¹A
2 + ¹B
2 ). Player A chooses ¹A
2 to maximize
r(1 ¡ F(¡±1 ¡ ¹A
2 + ¹B
2 )) ¡ C(¹A
2 );
where ¹B
2 is taken as given. The necessary ¯rst order condition for A is
C0(¹A
2 ) = rf(¡±1 ¡ ¹A
2 + ¹B
2 ):
Given the same ¯rst half score di®erence ±1, player B wins the game if ±2 is negative, which
occurs with probability F(¡±1 ¡ ¹A
2 + ¹B
2 ). Therefore, the ¯rst order condition for B is:
C0(¹B
2 ) = rf(¡±1 ¡ ¹A
2 + ¹B
2 ):
The above two ¯rst order conditions imply that ¹A
2 = ¹B
2 regardless of the ¯rst half score
di®erence ±1. That is, in equilibrium the leading player (player A if ±1 > 0 and B if ±1 < 0)
and the trailing player choose the same level of e®ort. This result is due to the fact that in
the second half the marginal bene¯t of e®ort, in terms of increased probability of winning,
is the same for the winning player and for the losing player.6
6 We note that the same result obtains even if the noise density function f is asymmetric. Also, it
extends to a model with more than two periods. However, with more than two periods, equilibrium e®ort
before the last period is no longer the same for the winning player and the losing player. See the discussion
in Section 5.
{ 9 {Let ¹2 be the players' common equilibrium second half e®ort. It satis¯es:
(1) C0(¹2) = rf(±1):
Since C is convex with C0(0) = 0 and C0(1) = 1, the above condition determines a unique
¹2 for any ±1 and r, denoted as ¹2(±1;r). As a function of ±1, the equilibrium e®ort ¹2 is
symmetric around 0 because f is. This means that an individual player's equilibrium e®ort
choice in the second half is the same whether after the ¯rst half the player is leading by
some score di®erence ±1 or trailing by the same score di®erence. Further, taking derivative







Since C is convex, under our assumption that f is single-peaked at ±1 = 0, the sign of
@¹2=@±1 is determined by f0, the slope of the density function: @¹2=@±1 is positive if ±1 < 0
and negative if ±1 > 0. This means that the second half equilibrium e®ort increases if the
score di®erence ±1 gets closer to 0 and decreases if ±1 drifts away from 0.7
The state of the game at the beginning of the second half is summarized by ±1, so we
can write the equilibrium payo® of each player at the beginning of the second half as
v(±1) = rF(±1) ¡ C(¹2(±1;r)) + l:
Taking derivative and using the equilibrium condition (1) for ¹2, we have













1 + ²1 represents the score di®erence ±1 at the end of the ¯rst half, and ¹B
1
is taken as given. In the symmetric equilibrium, both players exert the same e®ort ¹1 in




7 Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) document this dynamics of e®orts in golf tournaments.
{ 10 {By the symmetry of ¹2(±1;r), the integral of the second term in v0(±1) (equation 2) vanishes,




Thus, the ¯rst half e®ort is chosen as in a static game with a noise term equal to the sum
of the noise in the two halves. Given that the two players exert the same e®ort ¹1 in the
¯rst half, the equilibrium score di®erence ±1 is a random variable with the distribution
function F. In what follows, we continue to write ¹2(±1;r) instead of ¹2(²1;r), to stress
that ¹2 depends on ±1, even though in equilibrium ±1 is equal to ²1.8
We can now compare equilibrium e®orts ¹1 and ¹2. Our ¯rst result shows that in a
rank order scheme, the second half can be more exciting than the ¯rst half in terms of
generating greater e®orts from the two players, but on average the second half gets boring.
Equilibrium dynamics of e®orts are characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In a rank order scheme, the second half e®orts are higher (lower) than the ¯rst
half e®orts when the ¯rst half score di®erence is small (large), but the expected second
half e®orts are at most as high as the ¯rst half e®orts.
Proof: Compare the equilibrium conditions (1) and (3). Since ¹2(±1;r) is symmetric





there exists some d > 0 such that C0(¹1) > C0(¹2(±1;r)), and hence ¹1 > ¹2(±1;r), if
and only if ±2







8 Later we will show that under any linear score di®erence scheme, the ¯rst half score di®erence is
also equal to the random noise. Thus, which scheme is used does not directly a®ect the score di®erence.
Our main theorem that rank order schemes dominate linear score di®erence schemes when spectators care
about suspense su±ciently does not result because rank order schemes induce closer scores. However,
when the game is modeled with more than two periods, the score di®erence is no longer pure noise under
a rank order scheme. See the discussion in Section 5.

























r ¡ C(¹1) ¡
Z
C(¹2(±1;r))f(±1)d±1 ¸ U;
where ¹k, k = 1;2, are equilibrium e®ort functions de¯ned in equations (1) and (3). Since
the equilibrium e®orts in the two halves depend only on r and not on l, the above optimiza-
tion problem is solved by ¯rst choosing r, which determines ¹1 and ¹2, and then choosing













Assumption 1 ensures that the second order condition is satis¯ed.9
Next, we consider the optimal linear score di®erence scheme. A linear scheme has two
parameters: the ¯xed transfer t, which can be either positive or negative, and a piece rate
9 To see this, write the objective function as the di®erence between revenue i(r) and cost k(r), where
i(r) = P1¹1 +
R
P2¹2(±1;r)f(±1)d±1, and k(r) = U + C(¹1) +
R
C(¹2(±1;r))f(±1)d±1. The ¯rst order
condition for the optimal r is i0(r) = k0(r), and the second order condition is i00(r) < k00(r). A su±cient
condition for the second order condition is that i00(r) · 0 and k00(r) ¸ 0 for all r, with at least one strict
inequality. Using the equilibrium conditions for ¹2(±;r) and ¹1 (equations 1 and 3), we can show that
under the assumption that C000 ¸ 0, these e®orts are weakly concave in r, and so i00(r) · 0. Similarly,
the assumption that C000 · (C00)2=C0 implies that the e®ort cost in each half as a function of r is weakly
convex, and so k00(r) ¸ 0.
{ 12 {s. If the ¯nal score di®erence is ±2, then A's reward is t + s±2 and B's reward is t ¡ s±2.
See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Under linear score di®erence schemes, the level of e®ort is the same for the two players
and for the two halves, and independent of the ¯rst half score di®erence. To see this, ¯x a
linear score di®erence scheme (t;s). Given the score di®erence ±1 at the beginning of the





2 + ²2 + ±1))f(²2)d²2 ¡ C(¹A
2 );
where ¹B
2 is taken as given. Given symmetry, the same second half e®ort ¹2 satis¯es the
necessary condition:
(5) C0(¹2) = s:
The equilibrium e®ort level ¹2 is a constant determined entirely by the piece rate s. The
equilibrium payo® of each player at the beginning of the second half is therefore
v(±1) = t + s±1 ¡ C(¹2):









1 + ²1 represents the random score di®erence ±1 at the end of the ¯rst half,
and ¹B
1 is taken as given. In equilibrium both players exert the same e®ort ¹1 in the ¯rst




Since v0 = s, the ¯rst order condition for the ¯rst half is the same as (5).
A constant level of e®ort ¹, determined by C0(¹) = s, is exerted by the two players
throughout the game. Given this, the designer's pro¯t maximization problem for the
optimal linear score di®erence scheme is
max
t;s (P1 + P2)¹ ¡ t
{ 13 {subject to the participation constraint
t ¡ 2C(¹) ¸ U:
The optimal piece rate s is given by 1
2(P1 + P2), and the ¯xed transfer t binds the partic-
ipation constraint.
A rank order scheme on average gets boring (generates low e®orts from players) in
the second half, but can become exciting when the game is close at the end of the ¯rst
half. In contrast, under a linear score di®erence scheme, players keep up the same level of
e®ort regardless of whether the game is close or lopsided after the ¯rst half. How do the
two schemes compare if both are chosen optimally?10
Proposition 1. When spectators care only about excitement, the optimal linear score
di®erence scheme dominates all rank order schemes.
Proof: Let (r;l) be the optimal rank order scheme, and let ¹1 and ¹2(±1;r) be the
equilibrium e®orts. De¯ne ¹ = 1
2(¹1 +
R
¹2(±1;r)f(±1)d±1). Then, since C is convex,
C(¹1) +
Z








¹2(±1;r)f(±1)d±1 = (P1 + P2)¹:
De¯ne s = C0(¹). Then a linear scheme with the piece rate s induces ¹, with a lower e®ort
cost to the players and the same revenue to the designer. De¯ne t = U +2C(¹), then (t;s)
generates greater pro¯ts than (r;l). Q.E.D.
The conclusion of Proposition 1 can be strengthened by noting that the optimal linear
score di®erence scheme implements the ¯rst best e®orts. The ¯rst best e®orts maximize
the di®erence between the revenue and the cost
P1¹1 +
Z
P2¹2(±1)f(±1)d±1 ¡ C(¹1) ¡
Z
C(¹2(±1))f(±1)d±1 ¡ U:
10 The proof remains valid if Assumption 2 is replaced by the weaker condition P1 · P2. By Lemma 1,
if P1 is su±ciently greater than P2, then the result of Proposition 1 is reversed. We ignore this possibility
as it seems unreasonable in sports tournaments.








Under Assumption 2, the optimal linear scheme with s = 1
2(P1 + P2) achieves the ¯rst
best.
4. Excitement and Suspense
Given the importance of rank order incentives in the design of ¯nancial incentives in sports,
the inferiority of rank order schemes to score di®erence schemes established in the previous
section calls for an explanation. Our attempt is motivated by the unique feature in sports
that spectators care about the dynamics of the game. We model this by assuming that
spectators value player's e®orts more when the game is closer. Formally, we assume that P2
depends on ±1. In particular, P2(±1) is symmetric around and single-peaked at ±1 = 0 (tied
¯rst half). This modi¯cation of spectators' preference captures the idea that spectators
enjoy both excitement and suspense. Spectators do not care about excitement only: a lop-
sided game is not appealing even when the losing side keeps up the e®ort. On the other
hand, spectators do not care about suspense only: they do not like it when the leading
player slacks o® even though it makes the game close. We show in this section that rank
order schemes perform better than score di®erence schemes when spectators have a strong
enough preference for suspense.
We capture the concept of increasing demand for suspense by assuming that P2 is
indexed by a one-dimensional parameter a, such that, with a slight abuse of notation, the
demand for suspense is greater under P2(±1;a) than under P2(±1;~ a) when a > ~ a. The
functions P2(±;a) satisfy: (i)
R
(P2(±1;a) ¡ P2(±1;~ a))f(±1)d±1 = 0 for any a and ~ a, and
(ii) there exists a function ®(a) such that @P2(±1;a)=@a > 0 if and only if ±2
1 < ®2(a).
We say that P2(±1;a) is more \concentrated" (with respect to f) than P2(±;~ a) if a > ~ a.
Intuitively, P2(±1;a) is more concentrated in the sense that the two functions have the same
expectation under density f, but the value of P2(±1;a) is larger for close games (middle
{ 15 {values of ±1) and smaller when a player has acquired a strong lead (more extreme values
of ±1 in either direction).
Increasing demand for suspense does not change the design of linear di®erence scheme.
Since the two players exert the same e®ort in the two halves regardless of the score dif-
ference, the optimal piece rate s depends only on the expectation of P2(±1), which does
not change. The ¯xed transfer t that binds the player's participation constraint is also
unchanged. In contrast, intuition suggests that the optimal rank order scheme should
change as spectators' demand for suspense increases. As P2(±1) becomes more concen-
trated around ±1 = 0, the designer will want to make ¹2(±1;r) also more concentrated in
order to take advantage of the fact that spectators have a greater demand for suspense.
How can this be achieved? From the equilibrium condition for second half e®ort ¹2, we
see that increasing r will raise ¹2(±1;r) for all ±1. But since the density function f(±1) is
uni-modal, the increase in ¹2 will be more pronounced around ±1 = 0. Thus, as P2(±1)
becomes more concentrated around ±1 = 0, the designer will want to increase r. This
intuition is con¯rmed in the following result.
Lemma 2. As demand for suspense increases, the incentive prize under the optimal rank
order scheme increases and the optimal pro¯ts also increase.
Proof: From the equilibrium condition for second half e®ort ¹ under rank order scheme














Under Assumption 1, @¹2(±1;r)=@r is also single-peaked around ±1 = 0.
With P2 as a function of ±1 and indexed by a, the ¯rst order condition with respect










{ 16 {Taking derivatives of the above condition with respect to a, we ¯nd that, dr=da, the e®ect








By condition (i) of increasing demand for suspense,
R
(@P2(±1;a)=@a)f(±1)d±1 = 0. Then,














By condition (ii) of the de¯nition of increasing demand for suspense, we can choose ® > 0
such that @P2(±1;a)=@a is positive for all ±1 2 (¡®;®), and negative for any ±1 < ¡®
or ±1 > ®. We have shown that @¹2(±1;r)=@r is symmetric around and single-peaked at
±1 = 0. Then, the above integral is positive both for ±1 < ¡® and for ±1 > ®, because
@P2(±1;a)=@a < 0 and @¹2(±1;r)=@r < @¹2(®;r)=@r. The integral from ¡® to ® is also
positive because @P2(±1;a)=@a > 0 and @¹2(±1;r)=@r > @¹2(®;r)=@r. It follows that
dr=da > 0.
By the envelope theorem, the change in the value of the objective function under the





We know that ¹2(±1;r) is symmetric and single-peaked, just like @¹2(±1;r)=@r. By a
similar argument as above, the above integral is positive, and therefore the value of the
objective function under the optimal rank order scheme increases. Q.E.D.
Similar comparative statics about the design and the pro¯ts of the optimal rank order
scheme can be carried out with respect to the density function f of the noise in the
game. A more concentrated f represents an environment of sports competition that is
less susceptible to pure luck of players, and therefore more responsive to their e®orts in
the game.11 Comparative statics with respect to the role of chance is interesting because
11 In our model, performance measurement errors decrease the likelihood that the score will stay close
in the second half and reduce the utility of the spectators. In the standard principal-agent moral hazard
literature, measurement errors increase the risk premium of the agent. In both cases, measurement errors
decrease pro¯ts by hampering the working of incentive contracts.
{ 17 {characteristics of a sports game can be, and indeed have often been, modi¯ed when changes
are introduced to the rules of the game, training technology for athletes, or equipment used
in the game. Formally, we can de¯ne \diminishing role of chance" in the game as follows.
Let the density function f of the noise be indexed by a one-dimensional parameter b, such
that there exists a function ¯(b) with @f(±1;b)=@b > 0 if and only if ±2
1 < ¯2(b). This
condition means that f becomes more concentrated for middle values of ±1. Intuitively,
when f becomes more concentrated, the game is more likely to be closer given any e®ort
levels of the two players, and the incentive designer should respond by increasing the
incentive prize, in the same way as when P2 becomes more concentrated. Indeed, the proof
of Lemma 2 can be directly extended to show that with a diminishing role of chance (that
is, as b increases), the incentive designer increases the incentive prize and the pro¯ts under
the optimal scheme also increase. Thus, diminishing role for chance has the same e®ects
on the design and the pro¯ts of the optimal scheme as increasing demand for suspense.12
We want to show that when spectators care enough about suspense in the game,
the optimal rank order scheme eventually dominates the optimal linear score di®erence
scheme. We establish this result indirectly, by noting that there is a rank order scheme
that achieves the ¯rst best e®orts in both halves if and only if f(±1)=P2(±1) is constant for
all ±1. The conditions for the ¯rst best e®orts in the two halves are given by equations
(6) in Section 3, with P2 replaced by P2(±1). These conditions can be replicated by the
equilibrium conditions (1) and (3) under a rank order scheme, if and only if f(±1)=P2(±1)
is constant for all ±1.13
12 There is an important di®erence between the comparative statics with respect to P2 and with
respect to f. In the case of increasing demand for suspense, the design and the pro¯ts of the optimal
linear score di®erence schemes are not a®ected, and therefore the relative advantage of rank order schemes
emerges. In the case of diminishing role of chance, one can show that the optimal piece rate s in a linear
score di®erence scheme is given by 1
2(P1 +
R
P2(±1)f(±1;b)d±1), which increases with b. Similarly, the
e®ect of increasing b on the pro¯ts under the optimal linear score di®erence scheme has the same sign
as ¹(s)
R
P2(±1)(@f(±1;b)=@b)d±1 (where ¹(s) is de¯ned by C0(¹(s)) = s), which can be shown to be
positive. Thus, with diminishing role of chance, performance is improved under both the optimal rank
order di®erence scheme and the optimal linear score di®erence scheme. The net e®ect on the comparison of
the two schemes is generally ambiguous. Note that in the above comparative statics exercise with respect
to f, Assumption 2 is no longer satis¯ed.
13 The role of Assumption 2 is now apparent. When the assumption is not satis¯ed, no reward schemes
based on ¯nal score di®erence, including rank order schemes and linear score di®erence schemes, can
implement the ¯rst best e®orts. This follows because the equilibrium conditions for the ¯rst best ¯rst half
e®orts and the second half e®orts cannot be satis¯ed at the same time. Intuitively, under our assumption
{ 18 {Now we are ready to show that rank order schemes dominate linear score di®erence
schemes when spectators' demand for suspense is su±ciently high. Consider the problem of
designing the optimal rank order scheme, for a given preference function P2(±1). For sim-
plicity, we assume that the rescaled functions P2(±1)=P1 and f(±1)=(
R
f2(x)dx) intersect
exactly twice, at d and ¡d. For the following result, we say that the demand for suspense




(i.e., if P2(±1) is more concentrated than f(±1) after proper rescaling.)
Proposition 2. If spectators' demand for suspense is high relative to the chance in the
game, then the optimal rank order scheme dominates all linear score di®erence schemes.













(@P2(±1;a)=@a)f(±1)d±1 = 0, so condition (i) of increasing demand for
suspense is satis¯ed. By assumption, @P2(±1;a)=@a is positive if and only if ±2
1 < d2 for
all a, so condition (ii) of increasing demand for suspense is also satis¯ed. Since P2(±1;0) is
proportional to f(±1), at a = 0 the optimal rank order scheme achieves the ¯rst best and
therefore dominates linear schemes. Lemma 2 then implies that the optimal rank order
scheme continues to dominate linear schemes when a = 1. But this is precisely what we
need, because P2(±1;1) = P2(±1) by construction. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 can be strengthened. The continuity of the pro¯ts under the optimal
rank order scheme in a implies that the conclusion of Proposition 2 can hold even if specta-
tors' demand for suspense is \a little" lower than the chance in the game. More precisely,
since when P2(±1) is proportional to f(±1), the optimal rank order scheme implements
the ¯rst best e®orts and therefore dominates linear score di®erence schemes, if the given
P2(±1) is just a little less concentrated than f(±1), the optimal rank order scheme still
that the reward for the players depends only on the ¯nal score di®erence, the incentives for the ¯rst half
and for the second half are directly linked (e.g., through equations (1) and (3) under a rank order scheme).
When Assumption 2 is not satis¯ed, such link becomes a binding restriction on what can be achieved
under a reward scheme based on the ¯nal score di®erence.









Figure 3. Relative performance: rank order and linear score di®erence
dominates linear score di®erence schemes. Figure 3 illustrates the case where the e®ort
cost function is C(¹) = 1
2¹2, and both the rescaled preference function P2 and the noise
density function f are normal, with precision (inverse of variance) hp and hf respectively.
The curve represents the ratio of the pro¯t under the optimal rank order scheme to the
pro¯t under the optimal linear scheme, as a function of hp=hf. Note that the optimal rank
order scheme outperforms the optimal linear scheme even when the demand for suspense
falls well under what it takes to make the optimal rank order scheme achieve the ¯rst best
(i.e. when hp=hf = 1).
Propositions 1 and 2 give us a clear picture of the comparison between linear score
di®erence schemes and rank order schemes. Linear schemes dominate when the demand
for suspense is low, while rank order schemes dominate when the demand is high. Indeed,
linear schemes and rank order schemes stand at the opposite ends of a continuum: a linear
scheme provides constant incentives to increase the ¯nal winning margin, while a rank
order scheme provides no incentive at all at the margin so long as winning is ensured. The
former achieves the ¯rst best when there is no demand for suspense (P2(±1) is independent
of ±1), while the latter achieves the ¯rst best when the demand for suspense matches the
randomness in the game (P2(±1) is proportional to f(±1)). One can imagine that there
are other schemes based on the ¯nal score di®erence that provide incentives intermediate
between those under the piece rate and the rank order tournament. Figure 4 illustrates
a family of such schemes generated by normal distribution functions of di®erent precision
(and zero mean). A natural question to ask is then: can these schemes achieve the ¯rst
best where linear schemes and rank order schemes fail?
{ 20 {final score difference
reward
Figure 4. Nonlinear score di®erence schemes
To understand how linear schemes and rank order schemes compare with other schemes
based on the ¯nal score di®erence, we begin with the question of whether the ¯rst best
e®orts can be implemented outside the two polar cases known from Propositions 1 and
2, namely, when there is no demand for suspense (P2(±1) is independent of ±1) and the
optimal linear scheme achieves the ¯rst best, and when the demand for suspense matches
the role of chance (P2(±1) is proportional to f(±1)) and the optimal rank order scheme
achieves the ¯rst best. Consider the class of nonlinear schemes n based on the ¯nal score
di®erence ±2. For analytical convenience, we restrict our attention to functions n(±2) that
are di®erentiable, with derivatives n0 that are symmetric around and single-peaked at
±2 = 0. We refer to n as a \nonlinear" scheme, although nonlinear schemes include linear
schemes as a special case with a constant n0, and rank order schemes as a limit case with n0
arbitrarily close to an indicator function with all weights on the point of ±2 = 0. Following








Compare these conditions to those for the ¯rst best e®orts (equations 6). A nonlinear




n0(±1 + ²2)f(²2)d²2 = P2(±1):
{ 21 {The above equation may not have a solution for the function n0 for given noise density
function f and the preference function P2.
We may think of the functions f and rescaled n0 and P2 as density functions of random
variables X, Y and Z respectively. Then condition (9) means that for the nonlinear scheme
n to achieve the ¯rst best, n0 is such that the random variable Z is the convolution of X
and Y (i.e., the sum of independent random variables X and Y ). This suggests that for
certain speci¯cations of the density function f and the preference function P2(±1), explicit
forms of the nonlinear scheme that induces the ¯rst best e®orts can be found. Suppose
that both f and P2 (after proper rescaling) are normal, with mean 0 and precision hf and
hp respectively. Then, the nonlinear scheme n achieves the ¯rst best if n0 is proportional to
the normal density function with mean 0 and precision (h¡1
p ¡h
¡1
f )¡1, as long as hp < hf.
For any ¯xed hf, as hp increases to hf, the optimal nonlinear reward function n converges
to a rank order scheme. In the limiting case of hp = hf, the rank order scheme achieves
the ¯rst best e®orts. This result serves as a special case of Proposition 2. If hp > hf,
there is no reward function n that achieves the ¯rst best. The demand for suspense is too
high relative to the noise distribution, and even rank order schemes fail to limit players'
incentives in the second half when the game becomes lop-sided at the end of the ¯rst half.
In this case the designer wants to reduce the incentives for continuing second half e®orts
to a minimum when the ¯rst half score di®erence is su±ciently large. Since rank order
schemes give no reward to the winner for the margin of victory, one naturally conjectures
that the optimal rank order scheme achieves the second best among all schemes based on
the ¯nal score di®erence, but additional assumptions are necessary to validate the intuition.
We focus on the \normal-quadratic" case, where the noise density function is normal
with mean 0 and precision hf, the preference function is proportional to a normal density
function with mean 0 and precision hp, and the e®ort cost function is quadratic. The
following proposition assumes that hp > hf. By a \normal" scheme we mean any nonlinear
scheme n such that n0 is proportional to a zero-mean density function up to a constant.
Proposition 3. If spectators' demand for suspense is high relative to the chance in the
game, then in the normal-quadratic case the optimal rank order scheme dominates any
normal incentive scheme.
{ 22 {Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that C(¹) = 1
2¹2. First consider the class
of di®erentiable schemes with symmetric derivatives, which includes schemes that provide














subject to the equilibrium conditions for e®orts (equations 7 and 8). Consider an alter-
native scheme ~ n(±2) = n(±2) + K±2. Since n is optimal, the derivative of the pro¯t with
respect to K vanishes at K = 0:
(10) P1 +
Z
P2(±1)f(±1)d±1 ¡ ¹1 ¡
Z
¹2(±1)f(±1)d±1 = 0:
The equilibrium e®ort conditions (equations 7 and 8) imply
Z
¹2(±1)f(±1)d±1 = ¹1:













subject to equations (11) and (8).
Now suppose that the optimal scheme n provides normal incentives for e®orts. Let
hn0 be the precision of the normal density function corresponding to n0. Since f is normal,
equation (8) implies that up to some constant the equilibrium second half e®ort function
¹2(±1) under n is also proportional to a zero-mean normal density function. Let h¹ be






f . Thus, h¹ < hf and h¹ increases with hn0. Since by hf < hp by
assumption, we have h¹ < hp. Consider the e®ect on the second half pro¯t (equation 12)






{ 23 {Since h¹ < hp, equation (11) implies that P2(±1)¡¹2(±1) is symmetric and single-peaked.
Moreover, @¹2(±1)=@h¹ is also symmetric and single-peaked. An argument similar to the
proof of Lemma 2 then implies that the derivative (equation 13) is positive. Since h¹
increases with hn0, we have established that the incentive designer can increase pro¯t by
increasing hn0. This contradicts the assumption that n is optimal among all schemes that
provide normal incentives. The proposition follows immediately from the fact that h¹
achieves the greatest possible value of hf under a rank order scheme. Q.E.D.
Now we brie°y comment on the restrictions imposed in Proposition 3. The assump-
tion of quadratic e®ort cost function allows us to obtain explicit functional forms for the
equilibrium e®orts. More importantly, together with Assumption 2, the quadratic cost
assumption enables us to use a variational method to separate pro¯t maximization in the
two halves. Without this assumption, the marginal cost of e®ort is nonlinear. Instead of















Equilibrium e®orts in the two halves cannot be separated, and optimal nonlinear schemes
would in general trade o® the ¯rst half e®ort against the second half e®ort. The normality
restriction for the noise density function, the preference function and the nonlinear schemes
reduces the comparison among f, P2 and di®erent nonlinear schemes n to a one-dimensional
parameter, and allows us to examine the e®ect on the second half pro¯t (equation 12)
through ¹2(±1), instead of through n0 and equation (8). As an alternative to the normality
restriction, one could imagine that there is a one-dimensional parameter, say i, which
indexes f, P2 and n0, with a greater value of i implying greater concentration. But in
general ¹2(±1) as determined by equation (8) as a convolution of n0 and f is not indexed
by the same parameter i.14 This makes it impossible to evaluate the e®ect of making
¹2(±1) more concentrated on the second half pro¯t (equation 13).
14 The convolution of two symmetric and single-peaked functions is always symmetric and single-
peaked, but even if the original two functions are ordered according to some one-dimensional parameter,
the result of convolution in general cannot be compared in terms of concentration. To see this, suppose
that g1 and g2 are symmetric and single-peaked (around 0), and let g be the convolution of the two, given
by g(x) =
R
g1(x + y)g2(y)dy. Symmetry of g can be shown by a change of variable. Single-peakedness
{ 24 {5. Discussions
In our model of sports games individual scores play no role in the design of incentive
schemes; only score di®erences matter. Since in most sports individual scores are observable
and veri¯able, one may wonder whether our results are robust if individual scores are used
in incentive schemes. To address this issue, we need to modify our model. Suppose that
µ
j










1 is a random variable. The second half score µ
j










Let ±i = µA
i ¡ µB
i be the score di®erence for each half i. We assume that ´
j
i's are i.i.d.
(across players and across time), with the distribution function H. To facilitate comparison
with earlier results, we maintain the other main assumption on the incentive contracts:
rewards to each player can depend only on the ¯nal scores µA
2 and µB
2 . Assume also the
designer's objective function is the same as in Section 4.15
The question we want to answer is whether there is any loss of generality to restrict
incentive schemes to those conditioned on score di®erences.. However, the opposite ques-
tion seems more immediate: why should player A's incentive depend on B's performance
at all? The answer is clearly that it should not if P2 is constant. That is, when there is no
demand for suspense, the two players should be independently rewarded according to their
follows from the result that
R
g0
1(x + y)g2(y)dy < 0 if and only if x > 0 (write the integral as the sum of R
y¸x g0
1(y)(g2(y ¡ x) ¡ g2(y + x))dy and
R
0·y<x g0
1(y)(g2(y ¡ x) ¡ g2(y + x))dy; both parts are negative
because single-peakedness of g1 implies g0
1(¡y) = ¡g0
1(y) > 0 for any y > 0.) Further, if g1 becomes
more concentrated according to a parameter i, an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 2 shows
that
R
(@g1(y)=@°)g2(y)dy increases with i, and therefore g(0) becomes greater. However, in general the
function g can change arbitrarily with i at other points, so that the concentration of g cannot be measured
according to i.
15 We note that in this alternative setup a player's score is independent of the e®orts of his opponent.
There is hardly any sport where this is completely accurate. Even for non-confrontational sports such
as sprint and swimming, it makes a di®erence whether an athlete is performing by himself or competing
against other athletes.
{ 25 {own scores. Of course, this is a just a special case of Holmstrom's (1982) celebrated re-
sult that tournaments have no intrinsic value in providing incentives in a team production
problem, if individual output can be measured and measurement errors are independent.
In our dynamic model, the players are risk-neutral, so under Assumption 2 the argument
used in proving Proposition 1 shows that the ¯rst best e®orts can be achieved with a pair
of individualized, linear incentive schemes. Clearly, the two individualized schemes are
identical, implying that a linear scheme based on the score di®erence achieves the ¯rst
best as well, which is precisely the import of Proposition 1. Thus, there is no reason to
tie the incentives of the two players together when there is no demand for suspense, but
symmetry and Assumption 2 imply that there is no loss of generality in using a scheme
based on score di®erences.
The situation is di®erent when P2 is a function of ±1. Now, the objective function
of the incentive designer introduces a link between the incentives of the two players. But
we will argue that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the incentives for one
player depend on the ¯nal score of his opponent only through the ¯nal score di®erence. To
begin, let mj(µA
2 ;µB
2 ) be the reward scheme for player j = A;B. It is natural to assume
symmetry, with mA(µ; ~ µ) = mB(~ µ;µ). As usual, we look at the equilibrium conditions in
the second half, given the ¯rst half scores µA
1 and µB
1 (and hence ±1 = µA
1 ¡ µB












2 ) ¡ C(¹A
2 );
taking as given ¹B
2 . This yields a necessary condition for player A's best response function






2 ) = C0(¹A
2 ):
An analogous condition for player B holds. The symmetry assumption implies that the
incentives facing player A when the ¯rst half scores are (µ; ~ µ) are the same as the incentives
facing player B when the scores are (~ µ;µ). The two conditions determine the second half
equilibrium e®orts ¹A
2 and ¹B
2 , which in general depend on both µA
1 and µB
1 .
Relative to the nonlinear schemes n(±2) analyzed in Section 4, a pair of individualized
schemes mA and mB can achieve second half equilibrium e®orts that are more general
{ 26 {in two ways. First, for a given ¯rst half score di®erence ±1, the total score µA
1 + µB
1
may di®er, and (mA;mB) can create di®erent incentives for the two players. Second,
for a given ¯rst half score di®erence ±1, the individualized scheme (mA;mB) can create
di®erent incentives for the leading player and the trailing player.16 However, with the
preference function P2 depending only on the ¯rst half score di®erence, and the e®ort cost
function C being identical and convex, there is no reason for the designer to exploit these
new possibilities allowed by individualized schemes (mA;mB). An argument similar to
the proof of Proposition 1 shows that any individualized scheme (mA;mB) that creates
di®erent incentives for the same ¯rst half score di®erence is dominated by another scheme
that homogenizes the incentives among di®erent levels of total scores and between the two
players.
Another restriction we have imposed on the reward schemes is that they do not depend
on the ¯rst half score di®erence. This restriction is not binding when there is no demand
for suspense, as the ¯rst best e®orts can be implemented with a linear scheme that depends
only on the ¯nal score di®erence (Proposition 1). This result is related to Holmstrom and
Milgrom's (1987) theory of linear incentive contracts in a model of a single risk-averse agent
with no wealth e®ect in the utility function. They show that in a dynamic environment
in which the agent can adjust his e®orts according to a commonly observed history of
output, the principal cannot do better than making the payment conditional only on some
aggregated output measure. In particular, the two-wage payment schemes proposed by
Mirrlees (1974) to approximate the ¯rst best do not work well because the agent can game
such schemes by conditioning his e®orts on the output path. Our Proposition 1 establishes
a related result with a di®erent logic in a multiple-agent setting. Rank order schemes
correspond to the two-wage payment schemes of Mirrlees, because the equilibrium e®ort
function in the second half depends on the ¯rst half score di®erence, while linear score
di®erence schemes correspond to linear contracts of Holmstrom and Milgrom, because the
incentives facing the players are constant throughout the game. Linear schemes dominate
16 This is impossible under any nonlinear scheme n with symmetric n0. Note also that the symmetry







means role reversal when the individualized scores are reversed not that the leading player faces the same
incentives as the losing player.
{ 27 {rank order schemes because constant incentives are cost-e±cient in our setting, not because
the players can exploit the dependence of incentives on the history of the game.
When the demand for suspense is so high that no incentive scheme based on the ¯nal
score di®erence achieves the ¯rst best, one naturally suspects that the restriction to ¯nal
score di®erence schemes becomes binding. Indeed, we now show that the ¯rst best can
always be achieved with a \conditional" linear scheme in which the intensity of incentives
depends on the ¯rst half score di®erence. If a conditional linear scheme with a piece
rate s(±1) and a ¯xed transfer t achieves the ¯rst best, then the second half equilibrium
condition for e®ort (equation 5) and the condition for ¯rst best second half e®ort (the
second equation in 6) must coincide. Thus,
s(±1) = P2(±1):
The equilibrium payo® function of each player at the end of the ¯rst half is therefore:
v(±1) = t + P2(±1)±1 ¡ C(¹¤
2(±1));
where ¹¤
2(±1) is the ¯rst best second half e®ort. This implies











Compare the above with the condition for the ¯rst best ¯rst half e®ort (the ¯rst equation in
6). For the conditional linear scheme with s(±1) to achieve the ¯rst best, the expectation of
the second and third term in v0(±1) must vanish. The third term does have a zero integral
with respect to f, because ¹¤
2(±1) is symmetric with respect to 0. However, the expectation
of the second term in v0(±1) is negative, because P0
2(±1) is positive (negative) when ±1 is
negative (positive). Thus, if the piece rate s(±1) of the conditional linear scheme is chosen
to make the second half e®ort the ¯rst best, the ¯rst half e®ort will be smaller than the
corresponding ¯rst best. The reason for this result is clear. For the second half e®ort to
{ 28 {be the ¯rst best, the piece rate of the linear scheme must be aligned with the preference
function P2. Through the e®ect on the ¯rst half score di®erence, the players anticipate
the impact of their ¯rst half e®ort on their reward. When choosing the ¯rst half e®ort,
players not only factor in the impact on their reward given the intensity of the incentives,
which is what the designer wants, but also the impact on their reward due to changes in
the intensity when the ¯rst half score di®erence changes, which is unwanted. The e®ect
of the unwanted anticipation by the players is negative on their ¯rst half e®ort, because a
greater ¯rst half score di®erence reduces the intensity of the incentives.
But this problem can be easily ¯xed, if the designer can also condition the ¯xed
transfer t on the ¯rst half score di®erence ±1. In this case, there is an additional term in
v0(±1), which is t0(±1), and the function t(±1) can always be chosen to exactly cancel the
unwanted second term in v0(±1). Other schemes can be conditioned on the ¯rst half score
di®erence to achieve the ¯rst best. For example, a similar analysis shows that a conditional
rank order scheme (l(±1);r(±1)) achieves the ¯rst best regardless of how concentrated P2
is relative to f. Again, it is essential that both the ¯xed transfer l and the incentive prize
r depend on ±1.
If conditional schemes help align players' incentives to spectators' interests, why are
such schemes seldom seen in practice? Conditional schemes are more di±cult to administer
than schemes based on the ¯nal score di®erences. The gain from using conditional schemes
may not be signi¯cant enough to outweigh the inconvenience in their use. This is especially
true if the demand for suspense is not too high relative to the chance in the game, if
there are many periods in one game, or if there are frequent changes in scores, so that
aligning players' incentives to spectators' interests requires frequent ¯ne-tuning of the
prizes throughout the game. A separate reason why complicated conditional schemes are
not used in practice may be that, when the demand for suspense is high relative to the
chance in the game, the incentive designer can use other tools to help the rank order scheme
manage players' incentives according to the state of the game. One such tool is to stratify
the aggregation of points in the calculation of the ¯nal score di®erence. For example, in
a tennis match, points are aggregated into games, games into sets, and the ¯rst player to
win a given number of sets (three or ¯ve) wins the match and the winner's purse. Similar
{ 29 {scoring schemes are used in volleyball and in playo® series in basketball. A related tool
is to end each period in a game or the entire game when the scores become lop-sided,
while prolonging the game when the score di®erences are small. Thus, a set in tennis can
be decided in six love-games, or it can continue inde¯nitely, at least theoretically, with
tie-breaking in each game. These tools are simple to administer, and can be e®ective in
economizing on incentives and aligning them to spectators' interests.
In this paper we have assumed that the game is divided into two halves and players
choose e®orts simultaneously at the beginning of each half. Ideally one would like to study
a model where e®orts are continuously adjusted as the game proceeds. In such a model,
equilibrium e®orts under rank order schemes can be asymmetric between the two players
as well as history-dependent, even if we maintain the assumption of symmetry between
the players in terms of the e®ort cost function. To see this, consider a variation of our
two-period model where there is a handicap score ±0 for one player at the beginning of the
¯rst half. Second half e®orts are characterized as before and continue to be symmetric. If
the symmetry in the ¯rst half e®orts still holds, we must have
Z
v0(²1 + ±0)f(²1)d²1 =
Z
v0(²1 ¡ ±0)f(²1)d²1:
The above condition will not hold because v0 is not symmetric.
More precisely, using the equilibrium expression of v0 (equation 2), and noting that
the ¯rst part of v0 is symmetric, we ¯nd that a necessary condition for equilibrium ¯rst
half e®orts ¹A
1 and ¹B
1 is given by
C0(¹B
1 ) ¡ C0(¹A




(²1 + ±0 + ¹A
1 ¡ ¹B
1 )f(²1 + ±0 + ¹A
1 ¡ ¹B
1 )f(²1)d²1:
When ±0 = 0, the above condition is satis¯ed if ¹A
1 = ¹B
1 . If ±0 6= 0, symmetric solutions
cannot obtain. Indeed, one can show that if ±0 > 0 so that A is leading B, then either ¹A
1
is strictly greater than ¹B
1 , or ¹A
1 is less than ¹B
1 by at least the score di®erence ±0. The
¯rst scenario is the more reasonable one: if A is leading B, then starting from the position
that A and B are exerting the same e®orts, the marginal bene¯t of asserting additional
e®orts is greater for A than for B, because keeping the score di®erence to the ¯nal period
saves e®orts for both A and B while reducing the score di®erence forces greater e®orts in
{ 30 {the ¯nal period from both players. This scenario is consistent with Dixit's (1987) result
that in a static tournament the favored player has incentives to over-commit e®orts in
order to preempt his opponent. But stronger conditions on the density function f and
the cost function C are needed to exclude the other possibility of ¹A < ¹B ¡ ±0, and to
characterize the e®ort dynamics. Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the conclusion that
spectators' demand for suspense is a necessary ingredient in explaining why the rank order
tournament is the dominant form of rewarding scheme in sports competitions.
6. Conclusion
This paper answers a fundamental question in the economics of sports: why are rank
order schemes the dominant form of incentive mechanism used in sports? Our answer is
that spectators of a sporting event care about e®orts of contestants when there is suspense
about the outcome, not about the e®orts per se. This conclusion is reached by considering a
dynamic version of tournaments ¯rst studied by Lazear and Rosen (1981). When spectators
care only about e®orts in the game, we ¯nd that linear score di®erence schemes dominate
rank order schemes, in the sense that the former induces greater e®ort with lower expected
reward. But when we incorporate the preference for suspense, which type of scheme
is better depends on how much spectators demand suspense. The more spectators enjoy
suspense, the better rank order schemes perform relative to linear score di®erence schemes.
When spectators' demand for suspense is su±ciently high, the optimal rank order scheme
not only dominates linear score di®erence schemes, but can also outperform a broad class
of schemes based on the ¯nal score di®erence.
The theory of contract has made much progress since the 1970s. Optimal design
of incentive schemes has become a standard exercise, and applications of the theory have
found success in many ¯elds, including labor economics, industrial organization, and sports
(Prendergast, 1999). However, empirical validation of the theory has lagged behind.17 In
17 Prendergast (1999) identi¯es this problem as he concludes his survey: \The typical theoretical
paper addresses how a certain institution may be optimal. Comparative statics, when o®ered, are usually
of the form that institutions or contracts are likely to vary with certain parameters. However, almost no
theoretical work has distinguished among plausible theories there." Chiappori and Salanie (2003) echo
the same sentiment at the start of their survey of recent empirical works based on the contract theory:
\Many papers consist of theoretical analyses only. Others state so-called stylized facts often based fragile
anecdotal evidence and go on to study a model from which these stylized facts can be derived."
{ 31 {the present paper we take the theory of contract to task and contrast the theory with
observed practices in incentive design. Our purpose is not to construct another theoretical
model based on some assumptions about the contractual environment and use the model
to derive optimal incentive design. Instead, we argue that by contrasting what contract
theory predicts with the incentive schemes that are used in practice, we can learn much
about the contractual environment. Our fundamental assumption is that incentive schemes
that are used in practice should outperform those that are not.
We apply this methodology of \reverse engineering" to sports, where incentives are
an important motivating factor for participating agents, and observations about actual
incentive designs are indisputable. We show that the observation that rank order incentive
schemes are preferred to linear incentive schemes implies that spectators do not care only
about contestants' e®ort. We identify a class of consumer preferences which incorporates
the demand for suspense, and under which rank order schemes can dominate linear schemes.
This class of consumer preferences is consistent with what can be directly estimated from
revealed preferences in the empirical sports literature. By identifying consumer tastes from
observed incentive design, this work also contributes to the recent literature that explores
the structure of consumer preferences (Becker, 1996).
An important assumption in our model of dynamic sports competitions is that con-
testants have the same abilities. This is a simpli¯cation made to facilitate characterization
of the equilibrium under rank order schemes. Incorporating heterogeneity among contes-
tants removes symmetry in equilibrium and complicates the analysis, but it can also bring
potentially important insights. Incentive schemes that recognize di®erential abilities, such
as handicapping, have been discussed by Lazear and Rosen (1981) in the context of the
optimal rank order scheme, and extended more recently by Moldovanu and Sela (2001) to
situations where abilities are private information. It would be interesting to explore these
implications in a dynamic context, particularly since our model o®ers a general framework
for comparing rank order schemes and schemes based on other relative performance mea-
sures. Quite apart from its function as an incentive device, rank order tournament may also
serve a sorting function when contestants are heterogeneous and information is imperfect.
Indeed, it may be argued that in actual competitions, identifying the athletes with supe-
rior abilities is as important as rewarding those who exert great e®orts. This is also true
{ 32 {in promotion tournaments in internal labor markets, where e±ciency often dictates the
identi¯cation and assignment of superior talents to more senior positions in the hierarchy,
as well as in patent races, where ¯xed ¯nancial bene¯ts are awarded based on rank order
comparisons of the proposed designs, even though the social value of a patented design
depends on how \innovative" it is relative to other designs. In these cases, the mechanism
designer is faced with the challenge of structuring the contest to e±ciently di®erentiate
the contestants. When e®ort is costly and the value of continuing e®ort depends on the
state of the competition as well as on the abilities of the contestants, a model of dynamic
competition that incorporates both sorting of abilities and incentives for e®orts may o®er
insights that are otherwise lost in a static analysis of the problem.
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